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Charles M. Wilson, 111*
HE survey year did not include a general session of the Texas Legis-
lature. During a called session of the legislature, however, one signif-
icant law was enacted, extending coverage of the workers'
compensation law to certain farm and ranch laborers.' The second part of
this Article summarizes these new provisions. The remainder of the Article
reviews the noteworthy decisions during the survey period that affected the
substantive and procedural law applicable to Texas Workers' Compensation
litigation.
I. STATUTORY PREREQUISITES
Article 8307, section 4a of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes requires that a
claimant seeking compensation give notice of injury within thirty days from
the date of injury or the first distinct manifestation of occupational disease.2
The claimant must also file his claim for compensation within one year from
the date of injury.3 Strict compliance with these time limits in the Act may
be waived, however, upon a showing of good cause.4 Article 8307, section 5
of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes provides that any party not willing to
abide by the final ruling of the Industrial Accident Board must file a notice
to that effect with the board within twenty days of the ruling.' Within
twenty days of the notice the dissatisfied party must then file suit in a court
of competent jurisdiction. 6 Unless the party files suit within the twenty-day
period, the district courts have no jurisdiction.7
A. Filing Claim for Compensation
In Texas Employers' Insurance Association v. Garza8 an injured worker
* B.B.A., J.D., The University of Texas. Attorney at Law, Carter, Jones, Magee,
Rudberg & Mayes, Dallas, Texas.
1. Act of July 20, 1984, ch. 33, §§ 1, 2, 1984 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 562 (Vernon) (to be
codifed at TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 2).
2. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 4a (Vernon Supp. 1984).
3. Id. Prior to August 29, 1983, the claim had to be filed within six months of the date of
injury. Act of Apr. 19, 1947, ch. 113, § 4a, 1947 Tex. Gen. Laws 176, 180, amended by Act of
June 19, 1983, ch. 498, § 1, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 2921, 2921.
4. Act of June 19, 1983, ch. 498, § 1, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 2921, 2921-22.
5. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 5 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
6. Id.
7. Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. LaCoke, 585 S.W.2d 678, 680 (Tex. 1979).
8. 675 S.W.2d 245 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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retained an attorney in February 1981. The attorney wrote a letter to the
Industrial Accident Board, but he did not file a claim for compensation. 9
The worker fired his attorney thereafter and, upon hiring new counsel, filed
a formal claim on the form provided by the Industrial Accident Board.
Fourteen months, however, had already expired from the date of his acci-
dent. Arguing that the short letter written by the first attorney did not com-
ply with the notification and claim provisions of the Act, the carrier
appealed the decision of the trial court in favor of the claimant. The court of
appeals affirmed, finding that the letter written by the first attorney was suffi-
cient to satisfy the statutory requirement for making a claim within six
months of the occurrence of the injury10 and that the form filed by the sec-
ond attorney constituted a proper amendment or addendum to the original
claim."
B. Good Cause
Two cases in this survey period considered the question of good cause in
relation to an injured worker's failure to file his claim for compensation
within six months from the time of the accident. In Goodwin v. Texas Gen-
eral Indemnity Co. 12 the trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of
the employer's carrier against the surviving widow of a deceased worker. In
reversing and remanding the case for further consideration, the appellate
court observed that the difficulty in using a summary judgment to dispose of
the good cause issue is that it requires an indication in the record that lack of
diligence is the only reasonable conclusion of the evidence. 13 Goodwin fur-
ther reemphasized that good cause places on the claimant a duty of continu-
ing diligence if he does not file the claim within the statutory period after
injury or death. 14 The claimant, therefore, must show proof that good cause
for the delay existed until the actual filing date of the claim. 's
In Employers Insurance v. Schaefer16 the court extensively reviewed the
case law pertaining to good cause, noting that mere reliance on the em-
ployer's promise to file a claim, without more, did not constitute good
9. The attorney's letter read as follows:
This letter is to advise you that I represent the above claimant in connection
with his claim for compensation arising out of the injuries he received on the
above date while working for Constructors Company, Box M, Premont, Texas.
I understand that a form for notice of injury and claim for compensation has
been previously filed. If my information is in error, please advise me immedi-
ately. I have this day also given notice of my representation to Texas Employ-
ers' Insurance Association.
Id. at 247.
10. The applicable filing period in Garza was six months. See supra note 3.
11. 675 S.W.2d at 248.
12. 657 S.W.2d 156 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
13. Id. at 160 (quoting Lee v. Houston Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 530 S.W.2d 294, 296 (Tex.
1975), in which the court stated that "[if there is any evidence of care and prudence in the
prosecution of the claimant's rights, the sufficiency of the evidence is a question for the jury").
14. 657 S.W.2d at 159.
15. Id.
16. 662 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983, no writ). For a discussion of the
pleadings involved in Schaefer, see infra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 39
WORKERS' COMPENSATION
cause. 17 The court in Schaefer found, however, that the insurer's payment
of weekly benefits and payment of medical expenses for a period following
the accident, combined with the employer's representations to the employee
that he had taken care of everything, constituted good cause for late filing.18
The evidence established that the injured worker first suspected the im-
proper handling of his compensation claim when he began to receive unpaid
medical bills. The worker then promptly contacted an attorney and filed a
claim for compensation. Despite the filing of the claim over fifteen months
after the accident, the court ruled that the facts established sufficient cause
to permit late filing of the claim.19
C. Filing Suit Within the Twenty-Day Statutory Period
Of the statutory prerequisites for institution of workers' compensation liti-
gation, this requirement generated the most appellate activity during the sur-
vey period, including two opinions by the Supreme Court of Texas and a
writ refusal by that court. In Johnson v. Texas Employers' Insurance Associ-
ation20 the worker filed his notice of intention to appeal the decision of the
Industrial Accident Board on June 14, 1982. The twenty-day deadline for
filing suit was Sunday, July 4th. The record established that the El Paso
County Commissioner's court passed a proclamation declaring the following
Monday, July 5, 1982, a county holiday for all county employees. The office
of the district clerk was, therefore, closed. The claimant filed his petition on
Tuesday, July 6th. The carrier successfully moved for dismissal based on the
failure to file suit within twenty days. The El Paso court of appeals affirmed
the trial court's dismissal over the strong dissent of Justice Preslar. 21 The
supreme court held that not only was Sunday, July 4th, a legal holiday, but
July 5th was also a legal holiday within the meaning of Texas law and, there-
fore, the suit was timely filed. 22 The court granted the application for writ of
error without hearing oral argument and reversed and remanded the cause
to the trial court. 23
17. 662 S.W.2d at 417. The court noted that this rule was particularly applicable when a
lengthy delay occurs between the promise and the ultimate filing date or the claimant had not
been told that a report had actually been sent to the Industrial Accident Board. Id. (citing
Allstate Ins. Co. v. King, 444 S.W.2d 602, 605 (Tex. 1969) (ignorance of claimant no excuse
for failure to file on time); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Herron, 569 S.W.2d 549, 554 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, no writ) (good cause depends on diligence exercised by
claimant)).
18. 662 S.W.2d at 418.
19. Id.
20. 674 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. 1984).
21. 668 S.W.2d 837, 839 (Tex. App.-El Paso) (Preslar, J., dissenting), rev'd, 674 S.W.2d
761 (Tex. 1984). Judge Preslar argued that the majority opinion did not comport with the
legislative direction that the Workers' Compensation Act should be liberally construed.
22. 674 S.W.2d at 762 (citing Blackman v. Housing Auth., 152 Tex. 21, 254 S.W.2d 103
(1953)). In Blackman the supreme court held that under TEX. R. Civ. P. 4 legal holidays
include not only those days designated in TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4591 (Vernon
Supp. 1984), but also those recognized by legislative declaration as being general holidays by
popular acceptance. 152 Tex. at 24, 254 S.W.2d at 105.
23. 674 S.W.2d at 762.
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In American Motorist Insurance Co. v. Simeck 24 the carrier filed its notice
of intent to file suit to set aside an order of the Industrial Accident Board on
January 23, 1981. On February 9, 1981, the carrier mailed its original peti-
tion with adequate first-class postage. The court received the petition on
February 13, 1981, twenty-one days after the carrier had filed its notice. The
injured worker argued that, because section 5 of article 8307 of the Texas
Revised Civil Statutes is a jurisdictional limitation under the Act, rule 5 of
the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure25 should not operate to extend the filing
period. The court of appeals concluded that if a party to such an action
sends a petition to the clerk of the proper court by first-class United States
mail with proper postage, mails it one day or more before the expiration of
the twenty-day statutory period, and the clerk receives the petition not more
than ten days after the statutory period expires, then the filing of the suit is
timely.26 The supreme court, obviously agreeing with the correctness of this
decision, refused the writ. 27
The most significant decision by the supreme court in this area occurred in
Ealey v. Insurance Co. of North America.28 In Ealey the carrier decided to
appeal the order of the Industrial Accident Board. The carrier sued to set
aside the award in the name of the parent insurance company, however,
rather than in the name of its wholly owned subsidiary, which was the em-
ployer's actual compensation insurance carrier. 29 The trial court granted
the plaintiff's motion to dismiss for failure to comply with the jurisdictional
requirements of filing suit. The appellate court reversed the lower court's
decision in a per curiam opinion and remanded for trial on the merits. The
supreme court held that the filing of the petition tolled the running of the
limitations period against the subsidiary, noting that the erroneous naming
of the parent company did not mislead the injured worker or place her at
any disadvantage. 30
In a concurring opinion, Justice Ray agreed with the result reached by the
majority, but he pointed out that the majority opinion implicitly reversed the
decision in Garcia v. Employers Casualty Co. 31 Justice Robertson separately
concurred and cautioned that by virtue of the majority opinion and its im-
24. 657 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1983, writ ref'd).
25. TEX. R. Civ. P. 5(b) stated that a court may permit an act "to be done after the
expiration of the specified period where good cause is shown for the failure to act."
26. 657 S.W.2d at 930.
27. 27 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 212 (Feb. 18, 1984).
28. 660 S.W.2d 50 (Tex. 1983).
29. The original petition was otherwise accurate because it correctly listed the injured
worker, the date and type of injury, the name of the employer, the number and nature of
proceedings before the board, the date of the board's award, and the notice of intent to appeal.
Id. at 51.
30. Id. at 53.
31. Id. at 53-54 (Ray, J., concurring) (citing Garcia v. Employers Cas. Co., 519 S.W.2d
685 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1975, writ refd n.r.e.)). In Garcia the injured worker timely
filed an appeal against the wrong insurance carrier. The right insurance carrier used the same
office, officers, and phone numbers as the wrong insurance carrier, but the court held that suit
was not timely filed against a proper party as required by TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.




plied reversal of Garcia, both the complainant who mistakenly names the
insurance carrier in his petition and the compensation carrier who misnames
itself would toll the statute of limitations period. 32 Justice Kilgarlin dis-
sented, arguing that the majority's failure to mention Garcia created a
double standard for workers and insurance carriers with respect to the effect
of misnaming a party in a suit to set aside the board's award. 33
II. COVERAGE OF THE COMPENSATION ACT
A. Covered Employees
Since 1913 the Workers' Compensation Act in Texas has excluded farm
workers from coverage. 34 Consequently, Texas courts have frequently wres-
tled with the artificial consideration of whether an injured worker was a
farm laborer within the meaning of the Act. 35 In United States Fire Insur-
ance Co. v. Alvarez36 the San Antonio court of appeals dealt with this ques-
tion. Alvarez's injury occurred while spraying ice on cantelopes just prior to
their shipment. The carrier argued that Alvarez fell within the farm laborer
exclusion of the Act, since he performed the work on a farm and the work
dealt with a farm product. As a preliminary matter the appellate court ques-
tioned the basis for excluding such agricultural labor 37 and then concluded
that as a matter of law Alvarez was not a part of the farming process and,
therefore, not a farm laborer excluded from coverage under the Act.38
The Texas Legislature, after reviewing the status of this area of compensa-
tion law as reflected by the Alvarez decision, revised the relevant section of
the workers' compensation statute to cover certain ranch and farm laborers
as of January 1, 1985.39 The legislature amended article 8306 by adding
section 2b, which provides that Texas workers' compensation law shall ap-
ply to farm or ranch laborers who are migrant workers and who are either
32. 660 S.W.2d at 54 (Robertson, J., concurring).
33. Id. at 55 (Kilgarlin, J., dissenting). According to Justice Kilgarlin's interpretation of
the effect of the majority opinion, an insurance carrier may misname itself if it does not mis-
lead anyone, but a claimant may not misname an insurance carrier, even if he also misleads no
one. Id.
34. For the current version of this statute, see infra note 39.
35. See, e.g., Millers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Rawls, 500 S.W.2d 545 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Beaumont 1973, writ refd n.r.e.); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Derrick, 207 S.W.2d 199
(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1947, writ refd n.r.e.).
36. 657 S.W.2d 463 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, no writ).
37. Id. at 468 (citing Gordon v. Buster, 113 Tex. 382, 384, 257 S.W.2d 220, 221 (1923)).
The court, while noting that the original purpose of the Act was to deny coverage to persons
who did not work in hazardous employment, concluded that modem farm machinery was
indeed hazardous. 657 S.W.2d at 468. The court also regretted the lack of legislative guide-
lines available to the courts for determining members of the excluded class. Id.
38. 657 S.W.2d at 469. The court stated that the proper inquiry involves the work the
claimant is doing when he injures himself. If the Act covers that particular type of work, the
claimant's other duties are immaterial. Id. at 468 (citing Hardware Dealers' Mut. Fire Ins.
Co. v. King, 426 S.W.2d 215, 217-18 (Tex. 1968) (involving a dispute over status of hired
domestic servant at time of accident)). The court then determined that Alvarez's job was
commercial rather than agricultural by focusing on the boxing, loading, and icing down of the
cantelopes, activities incident to the commercial shipping process. 657 S.W.2d at 469.
39. See Act of July 20, 1984, ch. 33, §§ 1, 2, 1984 Tex. Sess. Law. Serv. 562 (Vernon) (to
be codified at TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. at 8306, § 2).
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seasonal workers or workers whose employer has a gross annual payroll in
excess of certain minimum limits.g° The Act specifies that the farm or ranch
laborer who is a seasonal employee must either work on a truck farm,
orchard, or vineyard, or for an employer with a minimum payroll as pro-
vided in the Act.4 1 The Act also establishes clear payroll guidelines that
apply to the employers of nonseasonal farm and ranch laborers covered by
the Act.42 This dramatic expansion of the coverage of the Act should reduce
the need for artificial distinctions that Texas courts used in previous years in
attempting to determine whether an injured worker was excluded from cov-
erage under the Act.
American States Insurance Co. v. Garza43 involved consideration of
whether the injured worker was a Texas employee. The undisputed evidence
established that the injured worker was recruited in Brownsville and worked
for his employer in a tomato canning plant in Indiana, where he sustained an
injury. The carrier appealed a verdict for the plaintiff, asserting that the trial
court should have submitted a special issue inquiring whether the injured
worker was a Texas employee. Former Texas law required an injured
worker seeking compensation in Texas for injuries suffered outside the state
to show either that he normally worked in Texas or at least that his em-
ployer contemplated that he would work in Texas as well as the other
state.44 The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment, however,
based on its interpretation of the 1977 amendment to the Act's extraterrito-
rial provision.45 The court stated that section 19 of article 8306 only re-
quired the worker seeking compensation in Texas for an out-of-state injury
to show that he ws a Texas resident and that his employer recruited him in
Texas for the out-of-state job.4 6 Since Garza conclusively established his
Texas residency and recruitment in Texas, he satisfied the statutory standard
for entitlement to compensation.
40. See Act of July 20, 1984, ch. 33, § 2, 1984 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 562, 563 (Vernon) (to
be codified at TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 2b).
41. Id. To be covered by the Act in 1985, the preceding year's gross annual payroll must
amount to at least $25,000; in subsequent years, the preceding year's gross annual payroll must
equal or exceed the prior year's required payroll as adjusted for inflation. Id.
42. Id. at 564. Farm and ranch laborers are covered by the Act if their employer has a
gross annual payroll for the preceding year in the amount specified in § 2b(c). Id.
43. 657 S.W.2d 522 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983, no writ).
44. Id. at 523 (citing Southern Underwriters v. Gallagher, 135 Tex. 41, 136 S.W.2d 590
(1940)). In Gallagher the supreme court ruled that before an employee can recover for an
injury received outside of Texas, he must prove that he was a Texas employee who was sent
outside Texas to perform labor or services for his Texas employer. 135 Tex. at 44, 136 S.W.2d
at 592; see also Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Dossey, 402 S.W.2d 153 (Tex. 1966) (status of
claimant injured in New Mexico inconclusively established). The Dossey court ruled that the
employer must contemplate that the employee will work in Texas as well as the other state.
Id. at 155-56.
45. 657 S.W.2d at 524; see TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 19 (Vernon Supp.
1984). Section 19 provides in part: "If an employee, who has been hired or, if a Texas resi-
dent, recruited in this State, sustain [sic] injury in the course of his employment he shall be
entitled to compensation according to the Law of this State even though such injury was re-
ceived outside of the State .
46. 657 S.W.2d at 527.
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Smith v. Otis Engineering Corp.47 applied the borrowed servant doctrine in
determining whether one defendant in an injured worker's personal injury
action was properly severed from the suit by summary judgment on grounds
that it was immune as the injured worker's employer. The law is well-settled
in Texas that when a worker accepts employment with a company that car-
ries workers' compensation coverage, he waives his common law action for
recovery of damages due to injury sustained in the course of his employ-
ment.48 In Smith the injured worker was a general employee of Stewart
Well Service Co., but at the time of his injury he was unloading a large piece
of oil field equipment from a truck owned by Otis Engineering Corp. Otis
secured a summary judgment based on the fact that its own compensation
carrier had assumed responsibility and paid benefits to the worker. The
worker accepted these benefits and executed a release in exchange for them.
Otis contended that these facts established as a matter of law that Otis was
the worker's employer at the time of the accident. The appellate court re-
versed and remanded for trial, stating that the entity that possessed the right
to control the employee's work at the time of the accident constituted the
employer for purposes of determining workers' compensation liability and,
consequently, immunity from the employee's personal injury suit.49 The
court noted that while the borrowed servant doctrine recognized the possi-
bility of a division of authority in the right to control an employee's work,
compensation law requires the naming of one entity as the employer.50 In
any event, the evidence of payment of compensation benefits and the execu-
tion of the release were only probative and not conclusive in determining the
true employer. 5'
B. Activities Covered
Four appellate decisions considered situations in which the employee was
admittedly not performing his usual function, yet circumstances still brought
the employee within the coverage of the Act. In Bryant v. INA, 52 the injured
worker was laid off from her employment at a bakery in Corsicana, but she
did not receive her final paycheck before leaving the employer's premises
that day. Approximately two weeks later she injured herself inside the
bakery while walking to the pay window to pick up her paycheck. A dispute
arose during the ensuing summary judgment proceedings as to whether the
injured worker returned on the instructions of her employer, or whether she
could have received her paycheck by mail. The court of appeals reversed
and remanded the summary judgment granted in favor of the carrier, hold-
ing that when employment ceases and wages remain unpaid, the employer
47. 670 S.W.2d 750 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no writ).
48. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 3a (Vernon 1967).
49. 670 S.W.2d at 752 (citing Grimes v. Jalco, Inc., 630 S.W.2d 282 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, writ refd n.r.e.) (determining whether claimant was employee or
independent contractor)).
50. 670 S.W.2d at 751.
51. Id. at 752.
52. 673 S.W.2d 693 (Tex. App.-Waco 1984, writ granted).
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has not fulfilled his obligation under the contract of hire.53 The court, there-
fore, ruled that Bryant was a covered employee under the Act.54 The Texas
Supreme Court has granted a writ of error in this case. 5
In Director, State Employees Workers' Compensation Division v. Bush56 a
state hospital employee with a history of high blood pressure felt faint and
had an emergency crew take her to the hospital. When the crew unloaded
her from the van, the stretcher's wheels failed to drop and lock. The em-
ployee fell to the ground, injuring her neck and head. The appellate court
noted that if the injured worker had fallen and injured herself at the time
that she initially felt faint, she would have clearly deserved compensation
under the Act.57 Citing a very similar Indiana case in its analysis, the court
ruled that the jury could conclude that except for the emergency medical
services incidental to her employment the injured worker would not have
found herself on the malfunctioning stretcher. 58 The court ruled, therefore,
that the injured worker was in the course and scope of her employment
when the accident happened. 59
In Texas Employers' Insurance Association v. Ables 6° the deceased worker
was formerly employed by a drilling company. His father was his immediate
superior. The decedent attempted to fill up his father's pick-up truck from a
propane tank, and he subsequently died from suffocation due to inhaling
propane. Although refueling the truck was not part of the decedent's job
duties, evidence established that his father had instructed him to keep the
truck filled from the company gas tank. The appellate court affirmed the
trial court's verdict for the plaintiff, noting that the complaint of theft of
company gas was not appropriate because the deceased worker had his su-
pervisor's consent and did not, therefore, meet the requisite elements for the
criminal offense of theft.61
In Texas Employers' Insurance Association v. Campos62 the worker sus-
tained an injury in a fight with his foreman on the employer's premises. The
53. Id. at 695.
54. Id. The court noted that when an employee is instructed to return to pick up his final
paycheck, the employee remains in the service of the employer for that purpose. Id. (citing
Indemnity Co. v. Luce, 491 S.W.2d 767, 768 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1973, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (employee covered while on work premises to collect vacation pay)).
55. 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 54 (Oct. 27, 1984).
56. 667 S.W.2d 559 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, no writ).
57. Id. at 561 (citing Garcia v. Texas Indemnity Ins. Co., 146 Tex. 413, 419, 209 S.W.2d
333, 336 (1948)). In Garcia the Supreme Court of Texas held that the fact that a fall is caused
by an idiopathic condition totally unrelated to work is of no consequence when the worker
falls and injures himself on the floor or any other instrumentality of his employer's business.
146 Tex. at 420, 209 S.W.2d at 337.
58. 667 S.W.2d at 562 (citing McDaniel v. Sage, 174 Ind. App. 71, 366 N.E.2d 202, 203
(1977)).
59. 667 S.W.2d at 562. The court also noted Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Sedberry,
606 S.W.2d 35, 39 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.), wherein the court
restated the well-settled Texas law that an employee is in the course of his employment when
he performs acts of a personal nature that reasonably relate to his health and comfort, and that
such acts are considered incidental to the employee's service.
60. 665 S.W.2d 564 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
61. Id. at 567.
62. 666 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ).
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Texas Workers' Compensation Act expressly excludes from coverage any
injury caused by the act of a third person who intends to injure the employee
because of personal reasons, as opposed to reasons stemming from his em-
ployment.63 The evidence established that the injured worker had been set-
ting aside meat scraps for one of his employer's truck drivers and that his
foreman objected to this activity. The parties had an argument, and the
foreman jumped on top of the worker and injured the worker's back. The
appellate court concluded that this evidence was sufficient to support the
jury's finding that the worker suffered injury in the course and scope of his
employment.6
C. Injuries Covered
The cases reported during the survey period that considered the compen-
sability of an injury involved unusual fact situations or unusual injuries,
while three other cases focused on very narrow points with respect to admit-
tedly compensable injuries. In Texas Employers' Insurance Association v.
Perez65 the court held that the Act does provide a remedy for disfigurement
alone,66 but an injured worker may not recover for both injury and disfigure-
ment to the same body member.67 In National Union Fire Insurance Co. v.
Lucio68 the court established that the proper standard for measuring loss of
sight under the Act is the worker's uncorrected vision without regard to the
quality of his corrected vision.69 In Jackson v. United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Co.70 the court reviewed the trial court's reduction of the worker's
recovery due to contribution of prior injuries as provided for under the
Act.7' The appellate court affirmed a reduction of the jury's finding of
63. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § I (Vernon 1982).
64. 666 S.W.2d at 289 (citing Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Bradley, 415 S.W.2d 928, 933 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Texarkana 1967, no writ), which established that when the employee's injury arises out
of a personal difficulty over the manner in which his work is done, although the difficulty itself
is not a part of the employee's work, such injury is compensable under the Act).
65. 673 S.W.2d 669 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
66. Id. at 671; see TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 12 (Vernon Supp. 1984) which
provides in part:
In all other cases of partial incapacity, including any disfigurement which will
impair the future usefulness or occupational opportunities of the injured em-
ployee, compensation shall be determined according to the percentage of inca-
pacity, taking into account among other things any previous incapacity, the
nature of the physical injury or disfigurement, the occupation of the injured
employee, and the age at the time of the injury.
67. 673 S.W.2d at 672 (citing Goldman v. Torres, 161 Tex. 437, 446, 341 S.W.2d 154, 160
(1960) (burns to hand and forearm only single injury and no disfigurement recoverable)).
68. 674 S.W.2d 487 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1984, no writ).
69. Id. at 489. Even though use of a contact lens and glasses corrected the worker's vision
from 20/400 (legally blind) to 20/20 following the injury, the court allowed full recovery
under paragraph 19 of § 12 of the Act for loss of an eye. Id.; see TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN.
art. 8306, § 12 (Vernon Supp. 1984). Justice Osborne dissented on the ground that the major-
ity opinion conflicted with prior case law from other intermediate appellate courts and that
only the supreme court should change that law. 674 S.W.2d at 490 (Osborne, J., dissenting)
(citing Travelers Ins. Co. v. Richmond, 291 S.W. 1085 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1927, holding
approved) (corrected vision proper subject for evidence)).
70. 675 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1984, writ granted).
71. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 12c (Vernon Supp. 1984).
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twenty-five percent permanent loss of use of the worker's hand by one-half,
since the jury also found that twelve and one-half percent of the loss of use
was attributable to prior compensable injuries. 7 2 The supreme court has
granted a writ of error in this case. 7"
The primary cases considering whether the employee sustained a compen-
sable injury involved varied factual backgrounds. In International Insurance
Co. v. Hernandez74 the worker felt chest pains while at work. Doctors diag-
nosed an acute myocardial infarction. The carrier alleged that most of the
worker's disability resulted from his preexisting coronary artery disease and
not the alleged injury on the job. The appellate court stated that the mere
fact that the worker had a preexisting injury or disease that enhanced or
aggravated his injury did not defeat the claim unless the carrier showed that
the preexisting condition or injury was the sole cause of the claimant's pres-
ent incapacity. 75
The injured worker, on the other hand, must establish some specific in-
stance when a injury took place, as Williams v. Texas Employers' Insurance
Association76 demonstrated. In Williams the worker was a registered nurse
who became depressed following her father's death and had difficulty getting
along with her aging mother. She also became concerned that one of her co-
workers was turning the other nurses against her. She left her employment,
alleging that the combined emotional trauma prevented her from working.
In affirming a summary judgment for the carrier, the appellate court noted
that while the Act allows recovery for a disability resulting from a nervous
condition, the disability must stem from a sudden accident so as to demon-
strate that the employee has sustained an accidental personal injury.77 The
Texas Supreme Court has held that anxiety depression is not compensable
unless traceable to a definite time, place, and cause, thereby making it an
accidental injury.78
In Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co. v. Middleman79 the injured worker was
alleged to have sustained a hematoma on his thigh that resulted in his death
from an embolism approximately two days later. The deceased worker's
wife testified that at the time she drove him to work he was in normal physi-
cal condition. She further testified that the decedent did not injure himself
72. 675 S.W.2d at 342. The plaintiff had urged that the amount of the prior compensable
injury be multipled against the percentage of disability, thus reducing plaintiff's award by only
3.125%, rather than 50%. The court disavowed this method of computing the reduction. Id.
73. 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 54 (Oct. 27, 1984).
74. 659 S.W.2d 922 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983, no writ).
75. Id. at 923 (citing Baird v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 495 S.W.2d 207, 211 (Tex.
1973) (predisposing bodily injury did not defeat compensation)).
76. 663 S.W.2d 94 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
77. Id. at 95 (citing Olson v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 477 S.W.2d 859 (Tex.
1972)). In Olson the court emphasized that the Workers' Compensation Act was designed to
provide compensation for incapacity flowing from an accidental personal injury. 477 S.W.2d
at 861; see also TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 20 (Vernon Supp. 1984) (provision
defining injury or personal injury and occupational disease).
78. See Transportation Ins. Co. v. Maksyn, 580 S.W.2d 334, 338 (Tex. 1979) (after inter-
preting amended statute, court concluded Act meant to apply to accidental injuries).
79. 661 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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getting out of the car or entering his employer's premises. Circumstantial
evidence showed that a co-worker arrived some fifteen to thirty minutes
later, found the decedent sitting and rubbing his leg, and heard the decedent
state that he had injured his leg in the storeroom. A doctor diagnosed the
condition as a hematoma, which usually results from trauma. The dece-
dent's wife also testified that when her husband arrived home he was limping
and he stated that he had hurt his leg when he bumped it against a protrud-
ing box in the stockroom. The court found these facts sufficient to support
the jury's finding of an injury in the course and scope of employment with-
out direct evidence of the accident.
80
III. APPLICABLE WAGE AND COMPENSATION RATE
The Act defines average weekly wage as 300 times the average daily wage
or salary the worker earned divided by fifty-two.8 ' This formula applies
only if the injured worker had worked for his employer for at least 210 days
of the year immediately preceding his injury.8 2 In Texas Employer's Insur-
ance Association v. Bragg8 3 the court considered a case in which the claimant
worked for two different employers for 210 days in the year preceding his
injury. The evidence established that his job title varied during that period.
The worker obtained a judgment against the insurance carrier of the com-
pany he worked for at the time of the accident. The judgment based his
compensation on the 210-day formula. The carrier argued on appeal that
the evidence did not establish that the worker held the same type of employ-
ment for the 210 days that the statute required. After examining the testi-
mony and the record, the court concluded that oil field crews worked as
teams and frequently performed various functions; minor variations in the
actual work an oil field worker performed for two different companies would
not, therefore, prohibit application of the 210-day rule in computing com-
pensation.8 4 In Angelina County (Self Insured) Deep East Texas Workers'
Compensation Insurance Fund v. Modisettea5 the court considered a case in-
volving a county employee who had received disability retirement benefits as
well as workers' compensation benefits for the same accident and the same
disability. The court held that the insurance fund could not offset the disa-
bility benefits that the worker received through the county retirement system
against the workers' compensation benefits awarded the employee in a judg-
ment she obtained against the fund.
8 6
80. Id. at 185.
81. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § 1 (Vernon 1967).
82. Id.
83. 670 S.W.2d 712 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
84. Id. at 714 (citing Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Hacker, 448 S.W.2d 234, 236 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (evidence as to nature of business and duties
sufficient for special issue as to the 210-day rule)).
85. 667 S.W.2d 881 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1984, no writ).
86. Id. at 884. The court interpreted TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 8309h, § 5(a)
(Vernon Supp. 1984) to allow a reduction in an employee's pension benefits, by offsetting a
workers' compensation award against them, only after approval by a majority vote of the




The Supreme Court of Texas rendered two significant opinions in the area
of pleadings in the workers' compensation field during the survey period, the
first decision being the Ealey case previously discussed in the first section of
this Article.8 7  In the second case, Archuleta v. International Insurance
Co.,88 the Supreme Court of Texas dealt with trial pleadings in which the
plaintiff sought a determination of total incapacity. The trial court submit-
ted issues to the jury concerning both total and partial incapacity. The de-
fense objected, maintaining that the pleadings did not support an issue on
partial incapacity. The pleadings specified a dollar amount for a period of
weeks equivalent to the maximum amount allowable for total incapacity,
and the plaintiff's prayer sought judgment for this compensation as well as
general relief. The supreme court held that a pleading of total incapacity
authorizes the submission of issues on partial incapacity as well as total inca-
pacity if the plaintiff alternatively seeks recovery in both areas.89 The court,
therefore, held that the plaintiff's pleading, which included a general prayer
for relief, was sufficient to raise issues on both total and partial incapacity. 90
In Employers Insurance v. Schaefer9' the court dealt with the difficulty in
a variation between the pleadings of the plaintiff and the findings of the jury
with respect to the average daily wage of the plaintiff. The plaintiff specifi-
cally pleaded an average wage or salary of $45 per day, but the jury answers
to special issues determined that the wage rate should be $50 per day. The
court noted the well-settled rule that the judgment of the trial court must
conform to the pleadings, the evidence, and the verdict of the jury.92 The
court then held that the worker could recover only the maximum amount
contained in his specific pleadings and could not rely on his general
allegations.9 3
bar, however, the court stated that under no circumstances could any pension benefits received
be offset against the workers' compensation benefits dues. Id.
87. Ealey v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 660 S.W.2d 50 (Tex. 1983); see supra notes 28-33
and accompanying text.
88. 667 S.W.2d 120 (Tex. 1984).
89. Id. at 122 (citing Burns v. Union Standard Ins. Co., 593 S.W.2d 309 (Tex. 1980)).
The defendant in Burns sought an issue on partial incapacity. The plaintiff claimed that his
pleadings only raised the issue of total incapacity, but the supreme court held that the plain-
tiff's prayer for general relief allowed the defendant to raise the issue of partial incapacity. 593
S.W.2d at 311.
90. 667 S.W.2d at 122.
91. 662 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. App.-Corups Christi 1983, no writ). For a discussion of the
issue in Schaefer involving a good cause basis for extending the filing period, see supra notes
16-19 and accompanying text.
92. 662 S.W.2d at 419 (citing Longoria v. Atlantic Gulf Enters., 572 S.W.2d 71, 76 (Tex.
Civ. App-Corpus Christi 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (award in excess of pleaded damages errone-
ous though perhaps warranted); TEx. R. Civ. P. 301).
93. 662 S.W.2d at 419. The court stated that: "In a compensation proceeding, the com-
pensation of the employee cannot be computed on a basis of a wage greater than that pleaded
by the employee, notwithstanding the fact that the jury found the wage earned was greater




Disputes over the use of the rules of evidence and civil procedure as they
relate to the admissions of evidence generated numerous decisions during the
survey period. In Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. McCollum 94 a dispute arose
from a purported stipulation relating to the claimant's average weekly wage.
Some six weeks after judgment, the trial judge signed an order reciting that
the parties had entered into a stipulation on this issue. The carrier denied
making any stipulation, and it further complained that the purported stipu-
lation did not comply with rule 11 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure."
While striking the stipulation, the appellate court noted that no evidence
existed on the issue of the weekly wage rate.96 The court, however, refused
to follow the suggestion of the carrier to enter a judgment for the minimum
compensation rate and instead reversed and remanded the entire case for a
new trial.9
7
In Texas Employers' Insurance Association v. Williams98 the court consid-
ered two evidentiary points arising out of an injured worker's recovery of
total and permanent disability benefits. The claimant alleged that he con-
tracted asbestosis during his employment. The initial evidentiary point con-
cerned the carrier's objection to the admission into evidence of the
claimant's x-rays. The plaintiff introduced the x-rays not as business
records, but through the testimony of doctors.99 The doctors testified that
they either took the x-rays, or that the x-rays were taken under their supervi-
sion and control, and that each exhibit portrayed the portion of the anatomy
of the claimant that it purported to portray. The court of appeals ruled that
this proof was sufficient to make the x-rays admissible. 100 The second evi-
dentiary point dealt with the carrier's complaint about the claimant's asser-
tion that the substance with which he worked was asbestos. The undisputed
record established that the claimant worked for eighteen years carrying bags
labeled "asbestos" from Canada and shoveled, raked, and mixed the con-
tents. The court ruled that such evidence was not hearsay and was admissi-
ble absent contrary evidence from the carrier.' 0 1 The medical testimony
94. 656 S.W.2d 527 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
95. TEX. R. Civ. P. I 1 provides: "No agreement between attorneys or parties touching
any suit pending will be enforced unless it be in writing, signed and filed with the papers as
part of the record, or unless it be made in open court and entered of record."
96. 656 S.W.2d at 528.
97. Id. at 530.
98. 662 S.W.2d 728 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, no writ).
99. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 3737e (Vernon 1982), which provides that x-rays
may be admitted into evidence upon proof that they are made as a regular part of the business
of the hospital or medical organization, are made in accordance with good radiology tech-
niques by a person competent to make x-rays under the supervision of the Department of
Radiology, and show both the name of the patient and the date taken.
100. 662 S.W.2d at 731 (citing Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Waters, 356 S.W.2d 209,
211 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (x-rays supported by testimony of doc-
tors admissible)).
101. Id. at 731 (citing Better Beverage, Inc. v. Meschwitz, 643 S.W.2d 502, 504 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, no writ) (name on a label was sufficient, absent evidence to
the contrary, to show the manufacturer of the product)).
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further supported the court's conclusion in this case. 102 In Texas Employers'
Insurance Association v. Webb 10 3 the carrier complained that the trial court
allowed a doctor to testify as an expert witness after the plaintiff had failed
to designate the doctor as an expert witness in answers to the carrier's inter-
rogatories. Noting that the plaintiff had listed the doctor as a treating physi-
cian and that the parties had taken his deposition and had secured his
medical records, the court held that his testimony did not constitute a sur-
prise to the defendant and was admissible. 104
In Overstreet v. Home Idemnity Co. 105 the court encountered a frequent
problem in workers' compensation cases. The injured claimant had filed an
insurance claim with the group insurance carrier stating that her injury was
not work-related. Later, while in the hospital, she filed a claim under the
workers' compensation policy, which resulted in litigation. The workers'
compensation carrier asserted that the election of remedies made by the
worker entitled the carrier to a summary judgment. 10 6 The court of appeals
affirmed the summary judgment, 10 7 but the Supreme Court of Texas, in a per
curiam opinion, granted the application for writ of error and without hear-
ing oral argument reversed and remanded the case to the court of appeals. 108
The supreme court, despite the admissions that Overstreet made, 10 9 found
that the filing of a claim against the employer's group insurance carrier
before seeking workers' compensation in this case did not constitute an in-
formed election under Texas law." 0
VI. VENUE, SPECIAL ISSUES, AND JURY CONDUCT
A. Jury Misconduct
In Texas General Indemnity Co. v. Watson"' the jury returned a ten-to-
two jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff signed by the ten jurors who agreed.
On appeal the defendant alleged misconduct in that the majority did not
allow the two dissenting jurors to participate in discussion or voting on the
remaining issues after the dissenters cast votes contrary to the majority on
102. 662 S.W.2d at 731. The court observed that the sputum analysis showed asbestos
fibers and that the x-ray testimony established that the worker had asbestosis, which supported
the finding that he had worked with asbestos. Id.
103. 660 S.W.2d 856 (Tex. App.-Waco 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
104. Id. at 858 (citing National Sur. Corp. v. Rushing, 628 S.W.2d 90 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Beaumont 1981, no writ) (permitting witness not listed in interrogatories to testify is not abuse
of discretion)).
105. 669 S.W.2d 825 (Tex. App.-Dallas), rev'd and remanded, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 45
(Oct. 17, 1984) (per curiam).
106. 669 S.W.2d at 826-27. The court noted that the nature of the defense maintained by
the carrier was actually not election of remedies, but rather estoppel.
107. Id. at 827.
108. 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 46.
109. Overstreet's petition stated that she did not know why she chose to file under her
group medical plan. Furthermore, a physician had informed Overstreet that her condition was
related to her employment. 669 S.W.2d at 827.
110. 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 46. The rules for such an informed election appear in Bocanegra
v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 605 S.W.2d 848, 852 (Tex. 1980) (the four requirements are an in-
formed choice, multiple remedies, inconsistent remedies, and resulting manifest injustice).
111. 656 S.W.2d 612 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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certain issues. The court observed that while the Rules of Civil Procedure
allow ten of the twelve jurors to return a verdict, provided that the same ten
jurors concur on all of the answers in the court's charge,' 12 the same rules
require that the jury not enter into any agreement to be bound by a majority
or a vote of less than ten jurors.' 13 The court concluded that the exclusion
of the two jurors following the vote on a certain issue was jury misconduct as
defined under Texas law 14 and thus impermissible under the Texas system
of jury deliberation."15
B. Venue
In Texas Employers' Insurance Association v. Orozco"16 the carrier com-
plained on appeal that the injured worker had not established his residence
in the county where he filed suit to appeal the order of the Industrial Acci-
dent Board and that the worker had not properly pleaded his residence for
venue purposes. With respect to the proof, the court relied on the estab-
lished law of Texas that residence is primarily a matter of intention. 1 7 The
court then found that the record established the injured worker's intent to
consider Webb County as his home." 8 With respect to the complaint that
the pleading was defective for failing to allege the statutory venue fact pursu-
ant to the Workers' Compensation Act, 1 9 the court observed that the de-
fense had not brought the defect to the attention of the trial court and the
defect, therefore, was waived. 120
C. Instructions for Special Issues
Rule 277 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure provides in part that "the
court shall submit such explanatory instructions and definitions as shall be
proper to enable the jury to render a verdict."' 121 This rule does not encom-
pass inferential rebuttal issues, 122 and the submission of such issues is im-
proper under the Rules of Civil Procedure. 123 In Charter Oak Fire
112. TEX. R. Civ. P. 292.
113. 656 S.W.2d at 616; see TEX. R. Civ. P. 226a.
114. To show jury misconduct that entitles a party to a new trial that party must establish:
(1) that misconduct occurred; (2) that it was material misconduct; and (3) that based on the
record as a whole, the misconduct probably resulted in harm to that party. TEX. R. Civ. P.
327.
115. 656 S.W.2d at 616. The court stated that the modem jury system requires that all
jurors take part in the deliberations and that jurors have an obligation to listen to the opinions
of the other members. Id.
116. 669 S.W.2d 427 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1984, no writ).
117. Id. at 431 (citing Mills v. Bartlett, 377 S.W.2d 636, 637 (Tex. 1964) (residence fixed
when bodily presence and intention collide)).
118. 669 S.W.2d at 431.
119. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 5 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
120. 669 S.W.2d at 431 (citing Industrial State Bank v. Engineering Serv., 612 S.W.2d 661,
663 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1981, no writ) (defective pleading cured by amendment); TEX. R.
CIv. P. 90).
121. TEX. R. Civ. P. 277.
122. An inferential rebuttal issue is one that disproves the existence of an essential element
submitted in another issue.
123. Select Ins. Co. v. Boucher, 561 S.W.2d 474, 478 (Tex. 1978).
1985]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
Insurance Co. v. Taylor 124 the court held that when the evidence and plead-
ings establish the necessary elements of the inferential rebuttal issue of sole
cause, the trial court has a duty to submit an explanatory instruction even
though the carrier may not request a special issue on this matter. 125
In Mathis v. Ohio Casualty Insurance Co.126 the court of appeals affirmed
the trial court's submission of a definition of a "justifiable refusal to accept
suitable employment" in connection with a special issue on total incapacity
as provided in the workers' compensation law. 127 The court held such an
instruction to be within the court's discretion when raised by sufficient evi-
dence.128 The court stated in a dictum that even if the trial court erred in
submitting the definition, the definition would have been harmless. 129
D. Special Issues
In Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Allen 130 the trial court submitted is-
sues inquiring whether the carrier had failed to make weekly payments as
required by the Industrial Accident Board and whether such failure was jus-
tifiably excused.13' The carrier complained that the trial court's special is-
sues were erroneous in three respects: (1) the court excluded the statutory
phrase "to continue to make payments promptly as they mature;" (2) the
court submitted the statutory inquiry "without justifiable cause" in a sepa-
rate issue; and (3) the court changed the word "cause," in that separate is-
sue, to "excuse."' 132 The court of appeals held that the minor changes in the
wording did not change the underlying issue, which the court correctly sub-
mitted to the jury pursuant to the separate issues provisions of rule 277. 133
The holding in Allen restates the basic principle that the primary considera-
tion of the trial court in special issue submission is to submit the ultimate
issues of fact to the jury. The apparent simplification of the special issue
process appears also in Texas Employers' Insurance Association v. Wil-
liams.134 In Williams the trial court submitted only three issues to the jury
124. 658 S.W.2d 227 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, no writ).
125. Id. at 229.
126. 657 S.W.2d 868 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
127. Id. at 868-69. The trial court submitted the following instruction:
If a party unjustifiably refuses employment, even though such employment is
suited to her incapacity or physical condition, then such party can not be totally
incapacitated. A refusal of employment, even though suited to her incapacity or
physical condition, is 'justifiable' if a person of ordinary prudence in the same or
similar circumstances would have refused such employment.
Id.
128. Id. at 869.
129. Id.
130. 669 S.W.2d 750 (Tex. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
131. The trial court submitted the following special issue on justifiable excuse: "Do you
find from a preponderance of the evidence that such failure to pay was justifiably excused?"
Id. at 753. The carrier had tendered an issue that contained the wording "Do you find from a
preponderance of the evidence that Liberty Mutual . . .failed or refused, without justifiable
cause, to continue to make payments promptly as they matured?" Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. 662 S.W.2d 728 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, no writ); see supra notes 98-
102 and accompanying text for further discussion of Williams.
[Vol. 39
WORKERS' COMPENSATION
on the question of whether the plaintiff had contracted an occupational dis-
ease in the course and scope of his employment. 13
VII. DEATH BENEFITS
Two cases involved various aspects of the payment of workers' compensa-
tion death benefits to a surviving widow and minor children. In Orange
Grove Independent School District v. Rivera 136 the insurance carrier appealed
an award of the Industrial Accident Board and served the surviving widow
and mother individually and as next friend to her minor children. The car-
rier did not serve the minors with process. The minor children later sought
to have the case dismissed for lack of service as to them. The trial court
dismissed as to the minors, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Texas
Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that under the facts of that
case serving the minors through their next friend was proper.' 37 The
supreme court noted in its decision that some parts of the Act allow the
representation of a minor by a next friend or guardian. 38 Furthermore, the
next friend or guardian directly receives the compensation benefits in a death
case and then uses the funds for the support of the minors. 39 In these cir-
cumstances, then, the court determined that the statutory guidelines pro-
vided ample protection for the minors.' 4° The court explicitly confined its
holding, however, to the facts of that case. The court stated that its decision
did not relax the service requirements for minors in other types of cases or
even in other workers' compensation cases in which the minors' interests
were not similarly protected.141
In Texas Employers' Insurance Association v. Tobias 4 2 the carrier filed
suit to set aside the Industrial Accident Board's award of death benefits to
the surviving widow and minor children of a deceased worker. The trial
court granted summary judgment with respect to the three minor children,
awarding them one-half of the weekly compensation benefits. A dispute
arose over the timeliness of the widow's cause of action, and the carrier ap-
pealed the trial court's decision in her favor. The issue on appeal was
whether the wife had shown good cause for filing her claim late. The appel-
late court ruled against the widow on this issue and reversed that portion of
135. The trial court submitted to the jury the following special issues:
1. Do you find that Olan J. Williams has or had asbestosis?
2. Do you find such asbestosis arose out of and in the course of his employ-
ment by Standco Industries, Inc.?
3. Do you find that asbestosis was a producing cause of any total incapacity?
662 S.W.2d at 730.
136. 679 S.W.2d 482 (Tex. 1984).
137. Id. at 483.
138. Id. (citing TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 13 (Vernon 1969)).
139. 679 S.W.2d at 483. The court also stated: "We further observe that ordinarily those
benefits cease when the minor attains majority. This is unlike a common law action where




142. 669 S.W.2d 742 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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the trial court's judgment that awarded her benefits. 143
The children then sued for a redistribution of the statutory benefits to
them, including that portion of the benefits denied to the mother in the prior
litigation. The mother joined in this suit, seeking a reversionary interest in
one-half of the benefits upon termination of the last child's eligibility. The
trial court rendered judgment for the children and the mother for the full
relief sought. The carrier argued on appeal that the doctrine of res judicata
barred both the mother and the children from recovering any additional ben-
efits. The court of appeals held that the children's cause of action for the
additional benefits did not accrue until the prior litigation determined the
widow ineligible to receive them. 144 The prior judgment, therefore, had no
res judicata effect on the children's cause of action in the second suit. 1 45 The
prior judgment did not bar the widow's cause of action for a reversionary
interest in the additional benefits sought by the children, since this cause of
action could not accrue until the last minor child's eligibility terminated. 146
VIII. PRACTICE BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT BOARD
In Texas General Indemnity Co. v. Strait1 47 the Industrial Accident Board
entered an order following an administrative prehearing conference, di-
recting the insurance carrier to pay weekly compensation benefits until one
of a number of specified events occurred. The insurance carrier filed a peti-
tion to set aside the order of the board. The board intervened and success-
fully challenged the court's jurisdiction on the grounds that the board's
order was interlocutory and nonappealable. The trial court dismissed the
case for lack of jurisdiction. In affirming the dismissal the appellate court
noted that the Act empowers an interested party to appeal only a final deci-
sion of the board. 148 This position is consistent with the general law of the
state that only final administrative orders are appealable, and a final admin-
istrative order is one that leaves nothing open for future disposition. 149 The
court further noted that under the Act a party may request the board to
143. 614 S.W.2d 901 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1981, writ dism'd).
144. 669 S.W.2d at 745.
145. Id.
146. Id. The court also relied on Freeman v. Texas Compensation Ins. Co., 603 S.W.2d 186
(Tex. 1980). In Freeman the supreme court stated that the legislative intent of the Act was
that any eligible beneficiaries remaining should share any money that had been previously paid
to an ineligible beneficiary. 603 S.W.2d at 189-90.
147. 673 S.W.2d 334 (Tex. App.---Corpus Christi 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
148. Id. at 336; see TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 5 (Vernon Supp. 1984), which
provides in part:
Any interested party who is not willing and does not consent to abide by the
final ruling and decision of said Board shall, within twenty (20) days after the
rendition of said final ruling and decision by said Board, file with said Board
notice that he will not abide by said final ruling and decision.
To define "final" in this context, the court relied on Employers Reinsurance Corp. v. Holt, 410
S.W.2d 633, 636 (Tex. 1966). The court in Holt held that an order of the Industrial Accident
Board is not final so long as it reserves something to the board for further decision. Id.
149. See Manor Indep. School Dist. v. Leachelle, 647 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex. App.-Austin
1983, no writ); Railroad Comm'n v. Air Prods. & Chems., 594 S.W.2d 219, 220-21 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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review its decision at any time if the party believes that the decision is a
result of mistake or fraud, or if a change of conditions has occurred since the
decision. 150
IX. SETTLEMENT OF CLAIMS AND MODIFICATION OF AWARDS
In Texas Employers'Insurance Association v. Tobias' 51 the appellate court
considered the limits of the board's jurisdiction to review and correct orders
and awards in the context of a suit by minor children for redistribution of
benefits on account of ineligibility of another beneficiary. The carrier con-
tended on appeal that the trial court had no jurisdiction to redistribute the
benefits as ordered in its judgment. The appellate court recognized that the
Act empowers the board to review and correct awards affected by mistake,
fraud, or changes in conditions occurring since the award.1 52 The court rea-
soned, however, that since the board has no power to set aside a compromise
settlement agreement in a workers' compensation case,153 it likewise has no
power to redistribute compensation benefits upon the ineligibility of one or
more beneficiaries. 1 54 The court, therefore, held that redistribution of bene-
fits requires a declaratory judgment proceeding in the district court.1 55
In Charter Oak Fire Insurance Co. v. Currie156 the workers had received
one-half of a $9,900 third-party recovery. The carrier had received the other
one-half although it had only paid $3,690 in weekly compensation benefits.
The Dallas court of appeals ruled that the injured worker should recover
from the carrier the difference of $1,260 as an advance under the Act.157
X. MISCELLANEOUS
A. Exemplary Damages
The Act exempts employers from common law liability based on acts of
negligence or gross negligence, except for death cases in which the claimant
seeks exemplary damages. 158 In Ghazali v. Southland Corp.159 the wife of a
150. 673 S.W.2d at 336; see TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 12d (Vernon 1967).
The court stated that the purpose of § 12d is to allow review of actions by the board without
resort to appeal as provided in article 8307, § 5. 673 S.W.2d at 336 (citing Commercial Stan-
dard Ins. Co. v. Shank, 140 S.W.2d 273, 276 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1940, writ dism'd
judgmt cor.).
151. 669 S.W.2d 742 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see supra notes 142-
46 and accompanying text for discussion of the issue involving death benefits in Tobias.
152. 669 S.W.2d at 746 (citing TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 12d (Vernon
1967)).
153. 669 S.W.2d at 746 (citing Luerson v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 550 S.W.2d 171, 173
(Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
154. 669 S.W.2d at 746.
155. Id. The court further noted that when the carrier decided to appeal the board's final
award of death benefits in the first lawsuit, this appeal permanently divested the board of
jurisdiction over the matter. Id.
156. 670 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. App.-Dalas 1984, no writ).
157. Id. at 370; see TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 6a (Vernon Supp. 1984) (ex-
cess amount treated as advance of future benefits).
158. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 5 (Vernon 1967).
159. 669 S.W.2d 770 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, no writ).
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worker whom robbers shot and killed brought suit for exemplary damages
under the Act. The plaintiff's petition alleged that the employer failed to
provide security for its employees, failed to give employees necessary in-
structions, and failed to place proper signs and security devices in the store.
The carrier sought a motion for summary judgment without any extrinsic
evidence, simply alleging that the pleadings failed to state a cause of action
under Texas law. The appellate court found that the pleadings were suffi-
cient to give the employer fair notice of the alleged gross negligence. 16° In
addition, the court stated that sustaining the trial court's granting of the
summary judgment in these circumstances would be tantamount to holding
that an employer may never be grossly negligent. 161
In Bridges v. Phillips Petroleum Co.' 62 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit held that the Texas law creating the right for certain
persons to seek exemplary damages is constitutional, even though it prevents
parents and siblings from recovering if they are not "heirs of the body"
under Texas law. 163 In Martin v. Texaco, Inc.164 the court noted that the
mental attitude of the defendant becomes very significant in gross negligence
cases.' 65 This evidentiary consideration frequently lifts ordinary negligence
to the level of gross negligence as defined by Texas law. 166
B. Consortium
In Bennight v. Western Auto Supply Co.1 67 a husband and daughter
brought suit for loss of consortium resulting from injury to their
wife/mother. She was bitten by a bat in the warehouse area of a Western
Auto store. Following the injury, the worker reacted adversely to a pre-
scribed vaccine and became permanently blind and emotionally disturbed.
The trial court rendered summary judgment against the employee's daughter
on her claim for loss of consortium and impairment of support. The court
then rendered a judgment on the verdict that the husband take nothing on
his consortium claim as well. On appeal the court first recognized that the
husband could only recover for loss of consortium from his wife's employer
if these damages flowed from an intentional tort the employer had commit-
ted against the employee. ' 68 If her injury was accidental, then the Act barred
recovery of any dainages except the statutory benefits provided in the Act. 169
The court then determined that the jury findings to the effect that the em-
160. Id. at 775 (citing TEX. R. Civ. P. 45, 47).
161. 669 S.W.2d at 775.
162. 733 F.2d 1153 (5th Cir. 1984).
163. Id. at 1155; see TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 3 (Vernon Supp. 1984) (ex-
clusivity of remedy provided by compensation statute).
164. 726 F.2d 207 (5th Cir. 1984).
165. Id. at 210 (quoting Poole v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 638 S.W.2d 10, 12 (Tex. App.-
Houston [lst Dist.] 1982, writ refd n.r.e.)).
166. The first case that emphasized the defendant's mental attitude was Burke Royalty Co.
v. Walls, 616 S.W.2d 911 (Tex. 1981).
167. 670 S.W.2d 373 (Tex. App.-Austin 1984, writ refd n.r.e.).




ployer forced the employee to work against her will in an unsafe area where
she feared injury established the equivalent of an assault against her. ' 70 The
court determined that the employer committed assault notwithstanding the
jury's finding to the effect that the employer did not intend for the employee
to be bitten by a bat.' 71 The court held that the husband could recover for
loss of consortium, since the employer was liable for all damages that the
assault caused.
172
The court affirmed the summary judgment against the daughter, however,
on her claim for mental anguish, loss of consortium, and impairment of the
right to receive support from her mother. 173 The court admitted the incon-
gruity in allowing certain family members, but not others, to recover for
substantially the same harm. 174 Imposing liability for the damages sought,
however, would require the creation of a new duty owed to a new class of
persons, which only the supreme court or the legislature should do.' 75 Con-
cerning the daughter's claim for impairment of support, the court noted that
a primary purpose of the Act was to compensate for lost earning capacity. 176
Allowing a dependent to recover for loss of support in addition to the em-
ployee's recovery of benefits under the Act would, according to the court,
invite potential double recoveries. 177
Justice Shannon vigorously dissented from the award of loss of consor-
tium to the husband on grounds that the jury issues submitted were insuffi-
cient to determine whether an assault occurred.1 78 Absent the necessary
findings, Justice Shannon stated, the injury was accidental, rendering the
employer immune from the consortium claim. 179
C. Federal Preemption
In Rhudy v. Diamond Shamrock Corp.180 a former employee sued under
article 8307c of the Act,181 claiming that he was wrongfully discharged for
failure to forgo his compensation claim. The employer moved for summary
judgment on grounds that sections 7 and 8 of the National Labor Relations
170. Id. at 375. The jury answered affirmatively special issues asking: (1) whether the
store, "through its manager, intentionally maintained an unsafe place to work"; (2) whether
the manager "required Cathy Bennight to work in the loft against her will when he knew that
such a place was an unsafe place to work"; and (3) whether such action of the manager "was a
proximate cause of physical or emotional harm to Cathy Bennight." Id. at 375.
171. 670 S.W.2d at 378.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 379.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 380.
176. Id. at 379.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 381-82 (Shannon, J., dissenting). Justice Shannon noted that the special issues
did not establish that the manager intended to cause harmful or offensive contact or imminent
apprehension of such contact or that the employee was placed in imminent apprehension of
harmful contact. Id.
179. Id.
180. 670 S.W.2d 291 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, no writ).
181. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8307c (Vernon 1982).
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Act 82 covered an employee's cause of action and, therefore, the cause of
action was preempted by federal law. The trial court granted the summary
judgment. The appellate court reversed, stating that the worker's filing of a
compensation claim on his own behalf hardly constituted a "concerted activ-
ity" within the meaning of section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act. 183
The National Labor Relations Act, therefore, did not preempt the worker's
cause of action. 184
XI. ATTORNEYS' FEES
Evidence concerning contingent fees figured in two decisions relating to
workers' compensation litigation during the survey period. In Liberty Mu-
tual Insurance Co. v. Allen' 85 the plaintiffs sought a lump-sum recovery
under the Act for death benefits, statutory penalties, and attorneys' fees.186
They based the action on the carrier's allegedly unjustified failure to make
payments previously ordered by the Industrial Accident Board. At trial the
plaintiffs established that a contingent fee contract for this type of case was
reasonable and that the usual contingent fee varied between forty and forty-
five percent. The jury found that a reasonable attorney's fee in this type of
suit would be thirty-three and one-third percent. The appellate court held
that evidence of a contingent fee was proper and that it created an adequate
evidentiary foundation upon which the jury could calculate the attorneys'
fees award. 187
In Hartford Insurance Co. v. Branton & Mendelsohn, Inc. 188 the em-
ployee's attorney brought a successful third-party suit and recovered from
the third party the exact amount that the employee's compensation carrier
paid the employee. This amount was paid over to the carrier pursuant to the
Act to satisfy the carrier's subrogation interest. 18 9 The trial court ordered
the carrier to pay the claimant's attorneys' fees for obtaining the recovery,
and the carrier appealed. The carrier argued that the worker's attorney
must offer evidence of the number of hours and a reasonable hourly rate in
support of his fees under the statute. The appellate court held that the appli-
cable statute neither requires nor encourages the use of an hour-rate formula
for fees, but rather leaves the determination of the exact amount up to each
individual judge's discretion. 190 The court noted that the main emphasis of
182. 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158 (1982).
183. 670 S.W.2d at 293. The court quoted the Fifth Circuit opinion in NLRB v. Buddies
Supermarket, Inc., 481 F.2d 714, 717 (5th Cir. 1973), in which the court held that an em-
ployee's conduct is not concerted activity protected by the National Labor Relations Act un-
less performed to initiate, induce, or prepare for group action, or unless such conduct is related
to group action in the employees' interests.
184. 670 S.W.2d at 293.
185. 669 S.W.2d 750 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, writ refd n.r.e.); see supra
notes 130-33 and accompanying text for a discussion of the portion of Allen dealing with
special issues.
186. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 5a(2) (Vernon 1974).
187. 669 S.W.2d at 755.
188. 670 S.W.2d 699 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, no writ).
189. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 6a (Vernon Supp. 1984).
190. 670 S.W.2d at 703.
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the statute is on the benefit that the insurer receives in each individual
case.' 91 The appellate court then compared the six and one-half hours of
work, discovery, and trial preparation that the attorney for the insurance
carrier expended to the one and one-half years of preparation by the
worker's attorney and affirmed the trial court's award of 28.7% of the recov-
ery as a proper fee for the worker's attorney. 192
191. Id. at 704.
192. Id. at 702.
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